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THE PARAMETERS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL
RECONSTRUCTION:
SLAUGHTER-HOUSE,
CRUIKSHANK, AND THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Robert C Palmer*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Substantive due process is the legacy of allegiance to precedents
misunderstood and inadequately analyzed. The 1873 decision in the
Slaughter-House Cases1 has always appeared to nullify judicially the
privileges or immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment of the
United States Constitution. 2 The Court's reasoning in Slaughter•
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I. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). This article's analysis of Slaughter-House proceeds on the
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assumption that each opinion is logically consistent within itself until demonstrated otherwise. A
traditional or seemingly natural deduction from an isolated passage cannot be probative if it runs
contrary to the argument as a whole and if commentators can alternatively interpret the passage as
consistent with that argument. Traditional analyses of Slaughter-House tend to focus on isolated
statements without reference to the whole argument. The danger there is obvious. The danger
here is attributing too much rationality and intellectual rigor to a particular Justice. For our legal
system, however, the argument is more important than judicial reputation. That latter danger is
thus the one that we should accept as a by-product of a legal system that demands reasoned
explanations of judgments.
2. See J. BAER, EQUALITY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION: RECLAIMING THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 107 (1983); R. CORTNER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS:
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE NATIONALIZATION OF CIVIL LIBERTIES 10 (1981); C.
FAIRMAN, MR. JUSTICE MILLER AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1862-1875, at 184-85 (1939); H. HYMAN & W. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 1835-1875,
at 477-78 (1982); W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 432-33 (5th
ed. 1980); L. LUSKY, BY WHAT RIGH11 A COMMENTARY ON THE SUPREME COURT'S POWER TO
REVISE THE CONSTITUTION 193 (1975); R. MYKKELTVEDT, THE NATIONALIZATION OF THE BILL
OF RIGHTS 15 (1983); 2 B. SCHWARTZ, A COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 763 (1968); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§ 7-4, at 423 (1978); Beth, The
Slaughter-House Case9-Revisited, 23 LA. L. REv. 487, 493, 497 (1963); Conant, Antimonopoly
Tradition under the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments: Slaughter-House Cases Re-examined, 31
EMORY L.J. 785, 789 (1982); McGovney, Privileges or Immunities Clause-Fourteenth Amendment,
4 IOWA L. BuLL. 219, 230 (1918); Morris, What are the Privileges and Immunities of Citizens of the
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House, however, demands a substantial role for that clause in adjudicating constitutional rights. In Slaughter-House the Supreme Court
made its first and broadest consideration of a major new approach to
analyzing the relationship between the states and the federal government. The Court also decided on a mode of constitutional interpretation that provided adherence to constitutional original intent even
when socially there was no single, definable, original intent. In United
States v. Cruikshank, 3 only three years later, a somewhat differently
constituted Supreme Court ignored the problem of original intent and
misconstrued Slaughter-House. The inferior reasoning in Cruikshank
thereafter prevented accurate intetpretation and acceptance of the careful reasoning of Slaughter-House.
This article analyzes both Slaughter-House and Cruikshank by focusing first on the reasoned construction of the fourteenth amendment
suggested in Slaughter-House. Under the Slaughter-House reasoning,
the fourteenth amendment incorporates enumerated liberties as privileges or immunities of United States citizenship which courts may enforce against the states. While adopting a moderate interpretation of
the fourteenth amendment privileges or immunities clause, the Slaughter-House Court concomitantly adopted a restrictive construction of the
due process clause. Cruikshank's rejection of the Slaughter-House approach led later Courts to construe expansively the due process clause.
That process resulted in modem exaggerated constructions of the fourteenth amendment in decisions like Roe v. Wade. 5
This article examines the development of constitutional doctrine
from Slaughter-House to Cruikshank in three sections. The first section
is a detailed analysis of Justice Miller's majority opinion in SlaughterHouse, examining his reasoning and the derivation of his constitutional
test. The second section analyzes the dissenting opinions in SlaughterHouse, showing the radical and unacceptable nature of their arguments. The third section discusses how in Cruikshank Chief Justice
Waite nullified the privileges or immunities clause without confronting
the language or the intent of the fourteenth amendment. 6 This article
United Stales?, 28 W.VA. L.Q. 38, 52 (1921); Royall, The Fourteenth Amendment: The SlaughterHouse Cases, 4 S.L. REv. (n.s.) 558, 576 (1878); Scott, Justice Bradley's Evolving Concept of the
Fourteenth Amendment from the Slaughterhouse Cases to the Civil Rights Cases, 25 RuTGERS L.
REv. 552, 555 (1971). Two minor exceptions to the traditional interpretation are 2 W.W. CRossKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION 1128-30 (1953) and J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST
196-97 (1980). See infra note 40. None of the commentators analyze the case as a coherent argument. The approaches run from selective quotation to the formulation of a series of propositions.
None go through the entire opinion to ascertain what role each part of the opinion plays in the
argument. The willingness to be content with superficial impressions is surprising.
3. 92 u.s. 542 (1876).
4. Tribe was so taken by Justice Waite's analysis that he used Cruikshank to explain
Slaughter-House. See L. TRIBE, supra note 2, at 420.
5. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
6. W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, supra note 2, at 433. Only for a brief period
of time did the Court ever find that state legislation violated the privileges or immunities clause.
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concludes that Slaughter-House embodies the Court's most rational
handling of the fourteenth amendment. The Slaughter-House rationale
required that the first eight amendments and much of article I section 9
of the Constitution apply as restrictions on state action through the
privileges or immunities clause rather than through the due process
clause. If the Supreme Court returned to Slaughter-House and restricted state action by using the privileges or immunities clause, the
Court would avoid the problems of expansive construction of due process. The Court would once more be applying constitutional provisions
of reasonably definite parameters.

II.

SLAUGHTER-HOUSE: THE MAJORITY OPINION

In Slaughter-House, Justice Miller constructed a carefully circumscribed argument that coordinated the fourteenth amendment with the
rest of the Constitution while according a proper and substantial meaning to the privileges or immunities clause. Justice Miller's was a middle
course, defined and revised in response to vigorous criticism from the
dissenting Justices. 7 Miller intended the privileges or immunities
clause to apply the first eight amendments and certain clauses of article
I section 9 of the United States Constitution as restrictions on state action. The major problems in understanding the opinion, however, pertain to the derivation of the "existence and protection" test for
fourteenth amendment protection and the influence of the comity
clause. 8
A.

Determination of Constitutional Purpose

In Slaughter-House various Louisiana butchers argued that a Louisiana state-granted monopoly violated their thirteenth and fourteenth
amendment rights under the United States Constitution. The monopoly granted one corporation the exclusive right to disembark cattle and
to provide facilities for cattle slaughter in and around New Orleans.
The butchers' thirteenth amendment claim was that the monopoly established an involuntary servitude by restricting the butchers' ability to
work. 9 Their fourteenth amendment claims focused on the infringement of their right to work by. the grant of an unreasonably large monopoly. The butchers argued that the state-created monopoly violated
7. For dissenting arguments concerning the status of inhabitants of territories, frustration of
tbe whole amendment, and an African-only approach, see 83 U.S. at 90, 96, 119. The arguments
are answered at id at 72, 79, 72 respectively. Furthermore, Field's criticism of Miller's use of Paul
v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869), is not really pertinent to Miller's actual statements. See
83 U.S. at 76-77. The internal debate, of course, might have allowed Miller to anticipate tbe
arguments in the dissents.
8. ''The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens
in the several States." U.S. CoNST. art. IV, § 2, cl. I.
9. 83 U.S. at 49-51.
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their privileges or immunities as United States citizens. 10
None of the Justices doubted the state's right to exercise reasonably its police powers in such matters. 11 The majority, however, affirmed the decision of the Supreme Court of Louisiana and ruled that
federal courts had no jurisdiction to review the reasonableness of the
state action. Therefore the opinion insulated states from federal review, at least regarding grants of monopolies. 12 The subject matter of
this case-an economic and unenumerated liberty instead of an enumerated liberty-was a major factor in the later distortion of Justice
Miller's careful construction of the fourteenth amendment.
Although Miller determined the original intent of the Reconstruction amendments by a quasi-historical method, he modified this approach in two ways. To Miller, the wording and grammar of the actual
amendments were always the best indicators of the amendments' purpose. 13 He thus believed that interpretational problems presented by
ambiguous or conflicting language were important even if the questions
thus raised had not been foreseen in the course of adopting the amendment. 14 Moreover, Miller believed that the historical setting derived
from the Justices' personal knowledge should be applied only in choosing between two possible interpretations of the wording. 15
Using this analytic approach, Miller dismissed the thirteenth
amendment argument. That amendment prohibited slavery and other
involuntary personal servitudes. The butchers' argument, based on inconvenience, payments to the monopoly slaughterhouse, and deprivation of their own slaughtering facilities, was classified not as a personal
servitude, but as a property servitude. 16 Even dissenting Justice Field,
although sympathetic, was unable to support the thirteenth amendment
claim. 17
In contrast to the thirteenth amendment claim, the Justices were
10. /d at 51-54.
II. /d at 62-66, 87-88, 113-14. W. NELSON, THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY,
1830-1900, at 152 (1982) seems to say that the major dispute between Miller and Field was interpreting the facts. On the contrary, the major issue was the status of state governments.
12. 83 U.S. at 82-83.
13. Miller's careful analysis of the characteristics of citizenship and the consequent need to
distinguish between state and federal privileges or immunities prove the priority of the language
and grammar in his analysis. This priority is appropriate because the Supreme Court should not
interpret the Constitution as emanating from the framers, the Congress, or the majority in the
ratifying bodies, but rather from the people as a whole. If one accepts this view, analysis of the
language is the only way to ascertain what the people wanted, because of the multitude of ambiguities and compromises embedded in adopting any constitutional provision.
14. Incorporation of the first eight amendments and article I, § 9 was not the social understanding of the effect of the privileges or immunities clause, even though some still argue that
position. SeeR. MYKKELTVEDT, supra note 2, at 7-ll. Such incorporation, however, is the only
approach that reconciles the varied motivations behind the fourteenth amendment with the ambiguous language of the amendment, in that it places substantial new restrictions on states while
retaining them as independent centers of social policy.
15. 83 U.S. at 68.
16. ld at 69.
17. ld at 89-90.
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unable to agree on the historical purpose of the fourteenth amendment.
The butchers' best argument rested on the privileges or immunities
clause. However, this argument conflicted with the majority's historical
interpretation of the fourteenth amendment. The majority reasoned
that Congress passed the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments to invalidate Southern laws permitting the continued subjection of former
slaves. The majority concluded that the purpose of all three amendments was thus the same: to assure the "freedom of the slave race."
Miller argued that the amendments would not have been suggested had
it not been for the race problem. Freedom of blacks was thus both the
cause and the purpose of the Reconstruction amendments. 18
The majority's determination of the purpose of the amendments
was crucial to the Slaughter-House holding. At the close of his opinion, 19 Miller considered and rejected an alternative interpretation of
the purpose of the amendment: to change the entire relationship between federal and state governments. This was the purpose that Justices Field, Bradley, and Swayne perceived. 20 Enunciating the purpose
as "freedom of the slave race" as opposed to "complete change of the
federal system" provided substantial meaning for the amendment but
dictated a restrictive reading. The racial freedom purpose, although
not pertaining to blacks only, 21 yielded a high threshold test: the four. teenth amendment would protect only those privileges or immunities
that fell "necessarily" and "properly" within the provision's language.22 The protection had to accord with the judicially perceived
purpose. Within that context, Miller began his clause-by-clause analysis of the fourteenth amendment.
18. As Miller wrote:
[N]o one can fail to be impressed with the one pervading purpose found in them all, lying at
the foundation of each, and without which none of them would have been even suggested; we
mean the freedom of the slave race, the security and firm establishment of that freedom, and
the protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those who had
formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him.
Id at 71.
19. ld at 82.
20. ld at 95, 123, 129; see infra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 22, 46-48, 57-58 and accompanying text.
22. The opinion states:
We do not say that no one else but the negro can share in this protection. Both the language
and spirit of these articles are to have their fair and just weight in any question of construction. Undoubtedly while negro slavery alone was in the mind of the Congress which proposed the thirteenth article, it forbids any other kind of slavery, now or hereafter. . . . [He
includes explicitly Mexican peonage and Chinese coolie labor systems.] And so if other rights
are assailed by the States which properly and necessarily fall within the protection of these
articles, that protection will apply, though the party interested may not be of African descent. . . . [I]t is necessary to look to the purpose. . . .
83 U.S. at 72. It is the thirteenth amendment context that gives this passage a racial-only tone, but
even so the passage is a clear refutation of the "black-only" allegation levelled at Miller. See, e.g.,
J. BAER, supra note 2, at 107.
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The Privileges or Immunities Clause

Miller and the dissenting Justices agreed that the fourteenth
amendment citizenship clause determined how they would interpret the
privileges or immunities clause. The historical context of the citizenship clause was that Congress added it to overrule the Dred Scott decision,23 which held that a black man could not be a citizen of a state
such that he could also be a citizen of the United States or receive the
protections mandated by the Constitution. 24 The citizenship clause asserted two types of citizenship based on different characteristics.
United States citizenship depended on birth or naturalization; state citizenship, on residency. 25 To Miller, the duality of citizenship in the first
clause meant that the immediately succeeding privileges or immunities
clause secured against state action only the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States. There thus remained another categoryprivileges or immunities of citizens of a state-that received no additional protection from this part of the fourteenth amendment. Because
Miller reasoned that the language and grammar of the amendment
were controlling, he found this conclusion irresistible. 26
Miller first determined that the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States did not automatically include every fundamental
civil liberty. 27 He deduced from the duality of citizenship that each
citizenship carried with it a different set of privileges or immunities.
However, he did not take the further step and assert that the sets were
discrete. 28 Miller used the immunities from ex postfacto laws and bills
23. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
24. 83 U.S. at 73. I use only Miller's and Field's readings of Dred Sco/1. For a modem
analysis, see D. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED ScoTT CASE (1978).
25. 83 U.S. at 73 (quoting the Constitution: "All persons born or naturalized in the United
States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof are citizens of the United States and of the state
wherein they reside." U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1).
26. Justice Field, for instance, agreed on the grammar but argued that the class of rights left
to the states alone included only those rights that were incidental and non-fundamental in nature.
83 U.S. at 95, 98; see infra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
27. In discussing Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230), in the
Slaughter-House opinion, Miller was not trying to define which rights remained to the states.
Miller did not state his objective, but one may derive its limited nature from the sequence of the
opinion-he did not reach his conclusion immediately after treating Corfteld. His treatment of
Corfteldis thus very important, but not as crucial as most commentators believe. If there is logical
coherence to his case-a necessary presumption-his objective was only to reject the fundamentality test. See infra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
28. Miller made several assertions that have led people to conclude that he thought the sets
were discrete. He stated that the citizenships are distinct. He characterized the plaintiffs' argument
as resting on the assumption that the citizenship and resultant privileges and immunities were the
same. He stated that, "If, then, there is a difference between the privileges and immunities belonging to a citizen of the United States as such, and those belonging to the citizen of the state as such,
the latter must rest for their security and protection where they have heretofore rested . . . ." 83
U.S. at 74-75. Lusky asserts, without documentation, that Miller took a further step. "Each type
of citizenship, Federal and state, carries with it a distinct set of privileges and immunities and the
two sets do not overlap; thus whatever is a privilege or immunity of state citizenship cannot be a
privilege or immunity of federal citizenship." See L. LusKY, supra note 2, at 191. This is a completely traditional product of a '::ruikshank reading of Slaughter-House.
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of attainder as prominent examples of immunities against governmental action that persons enjoy in the same relationship and character
both as state citizens and as United States citizens. 29 There was thus
necessarily a certain area where state immunities overlapped with federal immunities. His objective at this point, however, was merely to
show that some fundamental rights remained solely within the sphere
of the states. For Miller, this conclusion elucidated the general character of the nature of federal government. Miller simply argued that the
privileges or immunities of state and United States citizenship are not
identical.
Miller relied on the comity clause, as interpreted in Corjield v.
Coryelf3° and affirmed in Ward v. Maryland, 31 to establish the importance of rights left to the states. Miller easily turned to Corjield, because in both Corjield and Slaughter-House the right allegedly
infringed was an economic right endangered by a state-granted monopoly. In Corjield, Judge Washington provided three criteria to identify
those privileges and immunities of state citizenship that states had to
grant to citizens of another state. The privileges and immunities must
be "fundamental," possessed by citizens of all free governments as of
right, and possessed continuously by state citizens since the United
States's independence from Britain. 32 Miller concluded that the privileges and immunities of a state citizen embraced "nearly every civil
right for the establishment and protection of which organized government is instituted.'m Since duality of citizenship dictated that the two
sets of privileges or immunities were different, the fourteenth amendment did not automatically protect every civil right merely because it
was fundamental.
Having dismissed a test based on the importance of the right concerned, Miller then defined how any privileges or immunities clause
would operate. All the Justices felt that the privileges or immunities
language of the fourteenth amendment and of the comity clause carried
a similar meaning. Likewise, all the Justices agreed that a similar
meaning dictated identical operation. 34 That identical operation
presented Miller with the danger-and the dissenting Justices with the
prospect--of an interpretation of the fourteenth amendment that would
29. 83 U.S. at 77.
30. 6 F. Cas. 546.
31. 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 430 (1871).
32. Judge Washington stated:
We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges and immunities which
are, in their nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments; and which have, at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several states which
compose this Union, from the time of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign.
6 F. Cas. at 551. For the accuracy of Miller's treatment of Coljield, see infra notes 69-77 and
accompanying text.
33. 83 U.S. at 76. For Miller's misquotation of the comity clause, see infra notes 54-56 and
accompanying text.
34. For Field's agreement, see infra notes 84-87.

746

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1984

transmute all fundamental privileges and immunities of a state citizen
into privileges or immunities of United States citizens. Under such an
interpretation, the fourteenth amendment alone, by construction and
without unambiguous mandate, would then have completely overturned the federal structure established by the rest of the Constitution.
Miller obviated that danger by his construction of the 1869 decision in Paul v. Virginia, 35 which held that one state need not recognize
special privileges conferred by another state. Thus, under the comity
clause, while in state B a citizen of state A in addition to the Corjield
tripartite test, was entitled only to those privileges and immunities common to citizens of state B. State B did not need to recognize special
privileges granted in state A, such as corporate status and the associated
rights. By Miller's construction of Paul v. Virginia, the comity clause
did not create new rights in state B; it did not force any state to recognize rights granted by other states. Moreover, the comity clause did not
prevent a state from restricting its citizens' rights as long as the state did
not treat citizens of other states worse than its own citizens. 36 Miller
used Paul v. Virginia to establish the manner in which the privileges or
immunities clause would work: the fourteenth amendment clause
would not automatically transmute into federal ri~hts all important
rights enjoyed by the citizens of the various states. 3
Miller derived from Paul v. Virginia an "existence and protection"
test for determining the necessary and proper fourteenth amendment
privileges or immunities. 38 Under this test, any right that owed its
existence and protection to the federal government fell within the privileges or immunities clause; otherwise the right remained solely a privilege or immunity of a state citizen. 39 Later in the opinion, Miller
concentrated solely on "existence" but did not alter the affect of the
test. 40
35. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869).
36. 83 U.S. at 77. Field's lengthy refutation emphasizes the importance of this part of the
argument. See id. at 99-101.
37. Field would argue his way to the contrary conclusion. See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
38. 83 U.S. at 77. Here Miller is very careful not to exclude incorporation. He talks about
the improbability of transferring the protection of "all the civil rights" and "the entire domain of
civil rights" (emphasis added). Neither of those formulations would exclude partial transfer.
Moreover, he was concerned only about those civil rights that had belonged "exclusively to the
states." That would not include liberties expressed in the Constitution, even if there they were
only partially protected. See infra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
39. 83 U.S. at 77 (whether the rights of state citizenship "depended on the Federal government for their existence and protection. . . .").
40. "But lest it should be said that no such privileges and immunities are to be found if those
we have been considering are excluded, we venture to suggest some which owe their existence to
the Federal government, its national character, its Constitution, or its laws." /d. at 79. This was
mere shorthand; I cannot perceive anythirtg that would have changed had he also stipulated "protection" here. Crosskey maintains that assembly, petition, and habeas corpus rights were buried
in the listing so that no one would notice them; the Court could thus ignore the matter at will. See
2 W.W. CROSSKEY, supra note~. at 1128-30. Ely maintains that it is possible to read Slaughter-
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Miller's "existence and protection" test may have been inappropriate to the factual circumstances of Slaughter-House. Rather, the test
makes the most sense in the context of Paul v. Virginia, which focused
on the creation of rights. 41 The existence and protection language was
perfectly appropriate for discussing corporate rights. Only state action
brings a corporation into existence; a corporation cannot have preexisting or inherent rights. Corporate rights thus derive from governmental
action. Both Paul v. Virginia and Slaughter-House involved a grant; to
Miller, that similarity justified using the test. In Paul v. Virginia, however, the grant created the right claimed. In Slaughter-House the grant
was made in violation of the right claimed. The rights claimed in
Slaughter-House, moreover, were quite different from those in Paul v.
Virginia. The Slaughter-House rights were deemed to be preexisting,
either by natural law or by ancient common law. Miller, however, did
not elucidate the provenance of his test; the propriety of the analogy
never came into question. The "existence and protection" test, whether
or not appropriate, determined the scope of the fourteenth amendment.
By applying that test, the Court excluded the rights claimed in
Slaughter-House from fourteenth amendment protection. Some rights
clearly depended on the federal government for their existence and
protection. Miller identified several article I, section 10 provisions as
privileges or immunities that the federal government assured against
state action: security against ex post facto laws, bills of attainder, and
laws impairing the obligations of contracts. The Constitution, however, provided no protection against states that unreasonably granted
monopolies or hindered the pursuit of a common occupation. Such
privileges or immunities, regardless of their fundamental nature, did
not owe their existence or protection to the federal government. They
fell within the exclusive cognizance of the states as a privilege or immunity of a citizen of that state. 42 Fortuitously, that result coincided with
Miller's perceived purpose of the fourteenth amendment: the butchers'
claim had no relation to the purpose of "freedom of the slave race." 43
Miller thus derived a test based on case law that yielded an answer
within his parameters. The right to pursue a common occupation free
from unreasonable state-granted monopolies did not fall properly
within the protection of the fourteenth amendment.
Miller reached his conclusion only rhetorically, but his point was
well-made. At most, Slaughter-House concerned gross corruption exercised under the guise of the state's inherent authority to license matters
of health and safety. On the face of the claim, there was no racial discrimination. The state courts and the ballot box may have been the
House in a way that would have the whole Court agreed on incorporation of the first eight amend. ments, but his comment seems based only on the listing. See J. ELY, supra note 2, at 196-97.
41. 75 U.S. at 178-81.
42. 83 U.S. at 77-78.
43. ld at 78.
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appropriate forum for redress. A holding for the plaintiffs would have
subjected the whole range of state legislative activity to federal reasonableness review. 44 That result would not have merely reshuffled powers, but would have completely restructured the relationship between
state and federal governments. State governments would have become
incidental. Miller properly asked whether the fourteenth amendment
could have been intended to transfer such massive authority to the federal government.
Miller then answered the dissenting Justices' allegation that his
test nullified the privileges or immunities clause. He was convinced
that the test would be improper if the clause played no role in constitutional adjudication. For Miller, constitutional provisions had to have
substantial meaning. He listed three sources from which one might derive the privileges or immunities of United States citizens: the requirements of the national character of the federal government, the
Constitution, and federal law. He then set down a list-intentionally
incomplete45-of the privileges or immunities that would fall within
the fourteenth amendment under his test. Significantly, most of the
privileges or immunities listed did not relate directly to the purpose of
"freedom of the slave race"; the test, not the individuals or the right
concerned, was primary.
In 1868, Crandall v. Nevada 46 listed the privileges or immunities
that could be derived from the necessities of a national government. In
Crandall the Court had not been concerned with any particular constitutional provision, but rather with the derivation of privileges or immunities from the general nature of the federal government. In other
words, certain state practices would negate a national government.
Under Crandall, these "national" privileges included the right of access
to the federal government and sea ports, the right of a citizen of the
United States to protection when abroad, the right to use navigable
waters, and the right to enjoy rights secured by American treaties with
foreign countries.
Miller did not limit fourteenth amendment privileges and immunities to the context of racial discrimination. Access to the federal government would have been relevant for accomplishing the "freedom of
the slave race," but the other rights were fairly irrelevant to that purpose. Nevertheless, Miller felt that other rights fell necessarily and
properly within the scope of the privileges or immunities clause.47 But
these rights were already protected by the Court after Crandall without
44. A review of the reasonableness of state actions would not have retained the state character that the Court felt necessary. In some substantive areas, the states had to retain their position
as independent centers of social policy formulation. Reasonableness review was the core of the
Radical Republican position.
45. See supra note 40.
46. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868) (majority opinion by Miller, J.).
47. See supra note 22.
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reference to the fourteenth amendment. Had these rights been the sole
content of Miller's version of the privileges or immunities clause, that
portion of the fourteenth amendment would have been merely declaratory, a reaffirmation of the supremacy clause. 48 Miller's listing of national rights shows, at the very least, that Miller would not use the
purpose of "freedom of the slave race" to tailor the scope of the amendment only to blacks. The general language of the amendment required
that other matters would necessarily and properly fall into the scope of
fourteenth amendment protection.
The major new restrictions on state action came from the privileges or immunities Miller derived from the Constitution. He clearly
asserted that "the right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress
of grievances, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, are rights of
the citizen guarantied [sic] by the Federal Constitution." 49 These are
clearly not Crandall rights, not rights necessitated by the national character of the federal government. In his analysis, Miller listed the Crandall rights first in his three sources for determining privileges or
immunities. He then considered the privileges or immunities derived
from the Constitution, such as access to the federal government. Moreover, he specified that assembly, petition, and habeas corpus rights are
drawn from the Constitution: thus, from the first amendment and article I, section 9. Prior to the fourteenth amendment, all three of these
rights restricted only the actions of the federal government. 50 Miller
could have listed other privileges or immunities more cautiously, but
he did not even bother to repeat those privileges or immunities that
prior to the fourteenth amendment the Constitution already assured
against state governments: security against ex post facto laws, bills of
attainder, and laws impairing the obligations of contracts. 51 This listing, then, constitutes the best evidence of how Miller thought judges
should apply his test and of the necessary effect of the fourteenth
amendment privileges or immunities clause.
The listing of habeas corpus rights in particular renders untenable
the traditional view that Miller construed the privileges or immunities
clause as merely declaratory. 52 That interpretation would have Miller
positing some state interference with the federal right that the fourteenth amendment then forbade. The kind of interference normally
assumed was state interference with access to courts to obtain the writs,
but that would have been a Crandall right of access to federal government officials, not an article I, section 9 right. 53 The only way a state
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

U.S. CoNST. art. VI, § 2.
83 U.S. at 79.

See Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 248-49 (1833).
U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 10, cl. I; 83 U.S. at 77.
See, e.g., L. LUSKY, supra note 2, at 191-93.
Crandall rights are rights that citizens have merely as a correlate to the necessary powers
of the federal government. Such rights were already protected against state interference. State
obstruction of individuals attempting to obtain habeas corpus was handled not by article I, § 9,
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could abridge the article I, section 9 habeas corpus right was to grant
the federal government the power to suspend the issuance of habeas
corpus writs beyond the named emergencies. Not only had that never
been attempted, the suggestion is ludicrous on its face. Therefore,
Miller could not have meant that the only effect of the privileges or
immunities clause was to forbid states from interfering with already
established federal privileges and immunities.
Miller's listing demonstrates that those privileges or immunities
that prior to 1868 only restricted the federal government would now
also restrict state governments. Therefore, in regard to habeas corpus,
the fourteenth amendment forbids both federal and state governments
from denying issuance of the writs except in the named situations. The
rights to assemble peaceably and petition the government undergo the
same transformation. Miller's listing of the rights comes clearly from
the first amendment, since he says the rights are derived from the Constitution. He would have been quite clear had he been talking of petition and assembly in a Crandall v. Nevada fashion, as petitioning or
assembling for a national purpose. The proper conclusion is that that
kind of privilege or immunity that individuals had had against federal
government action they now had against state government action.
These privileges or immunities are directly related to the purpose of the
fourteenth amendment. As with Crandall rights, however, once Miller
formulated the test, he did not use the suggested purpose of the fourteenth amendment to select rights within the protected categories. The
privileges or immunities enumerated in the Constitution would be incorporated via the privileges or immunities clause.
Miller thought the fourteenth amendment accomplished its purpose by a change in jurisdiction without creating any new rights. 54
Prior to the fourteenth amendment, individuals had a right to assemble. That right was protected in part by the federal government
(against federal action and against all and sundry when the assembly
was for a national purpose) 55 and in part by state governments (in all
other cases of infringement). The right to assemble peaceably, by
but by the Crandall right of access to federal institutions. Article I, § 9 merely forbade the federal
government's denial of habeas corpus; it did not vest in the individual a right against state obstruction, nor did it mandate that the number of federal courts be sufficiently large that citizens
would have easy access to federal habeas corpus.
54. In his article, Morris tries to refute precisely this kind of perception. "Apparently the
idea is that there is some sort of trans-substantiation of the 'right' into the personality of the
beneficiary of it and it thereafter is his and ought to be exercisable in any aspect of his life." See
Morris, supra note 2, at 46 n.40.
55. Regarding the right to assemble, the Court stated:
The right of the people peaceably to assemble for the purpose of petitioning Congress for a
redress of grievances, or for anything else connected with the powers or the duties of the
national government, is an attribute of national citizenship, and, as such, under the protection
of, and guarantied (sic] by, the United States. . . . If it had been alleged in these counts that
the object of the defendants was to prevent a meeting for such a purpose, the case would have
been within the statute, and within the sovereignty of the United States.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 552-53 (note that the defendants in Cruikshank were private individuals).
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virtue of the first amendment, owed its existence and protection in part
to the federal government and was thus one of the privileges or immunities of United States citizens. The fourteenth amendment now forbade the states from infringing on those specified rights. The
amendment completed federal jurisdiction in those matters but created
no new rights as such. The difference between these matters and freedom from unreasonable monopolies was that the former were identifiable privileges or immunities of United States citizens. 5 6
The language of the amendment requires this conclusion, but so
also does Miller's interpretation of the purpose of the fourteenth
amendment. He previously had expressed his perception of the racial
problem and the problem of post-thirteenth amendment southern legislation. 57 Part of that problem was that southern legislation also suppressed whites by denying them the ability to assemble, petition, speak,
and exercise generally their civil liberties in favor of black freedom.
"Freedom of the slave race" for Miller was necessarily not a "negroonly" formulation. And so he later affirmed. 58
In the headnotes to Slaughter-House, which he authored, 59 and in
the next case decided by the Supreme Court, Bradwell v. State, 60 Miller
confirmed that he approved of the completion of federal jurisdiction
even though he disallowed the creation of new rights. The headnotes,
for example, indicate the privileges or immunities clause granted new
powers to the federal government.
The privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States are
those which arise out of the nature and essential character of the
56. For a treatment of the ninth amendment problem involved in distinguishing between
enumerated and unenumerated rights, see infra note 74.
57. Miller previously had stated:
Show me a single white man that has been punished in a State court for murdering a negro or
a Union man. Show me that. any public meeting has been had to express indignation at such
conduct. Show me that you or any of the best men of the South have gone ten steps out of
their way to bring such men to punishment or to take any steps to prevent a recurrence of
such things. Show me the first public address or meeting of Southern men in which the
massacres of New Orleans or Memphis have been condemned or any general dissent shown
at home at such conduct. You may say that there are two sides to those stories of Memphis
and New Orleans. There may be two sides to the stories, but there was but one side in the
party that suffered at both places, and the single truth which is undenied that not a rebel or
secessionist was hurt in either case, while from thirty to fifty negroes and Union white men
were shot down precludes all doubt as to who did it and why it was done.
Samuel Miller, Letter from Samuel Miller (Feb. 6, 1866) reprinted in C. FAIRMAN, supra note 2, at
192. His continual juxtaposition of "negroes" and "Union white men" indicates that he perceived
the problem of "freedom of the slave race" as necessitating protection of certain civil liberties for
whites also.
58. Oral Argument on heha!f of Defendant by S. W. Sanderson (Washington, 1883), at 24-25,
reprinted in C. FAIRMAN, supra note 2, at 187. Fairman notes that after Slaughter-House, Miller
did not suggest that "only discrimination against Negroes would be found to come within the
purview of the Fourteenth Amendment." C. FAIRMAN, supra note 2, at 187. In Slaughter-House,
he did not suggest that limitation either, except in reference to the equal protection clause. See
infra note 63. It is possible to be misled in this by Miller's headnotes, but when read in full, the
headnotes remain completely faithful to the text of the opinion.
59. Slaughter-House, 21 L.Ed. at 395. The authorship appears only in the Lawyers' Edition.
60. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873).

752

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1984

National government, the provisions of the Constitution, or its
laws and treaties made in pursuance thereof; and it is these which
are placed under the protection of Congress by this clause of the
fourteenth amendment. 61
By saying that the fourteenth amendment now "placed" the privileges
and immunities of national citizenship under the protection of Congress, Miller inferred that previously Congress did not have the power
to protect them.
Even more explicit is Miller's majority opinion in Bradwell v.
State. The Court denied a woman's fourteenth amendment claim to
freedom from sexual discrimination in her application to the Illinois
state bar. Miller applied his test rigorously, but noted explicitly that
the fourteenth amendment had transferred some powers to the federal
government:
[T]he right to control and regulate the granting of license to practice law in the courts of a State is one of those powers which are
not transferred for its protection to the Federal government, and its
exercise is in no manner governed or controlled by citizenship of
the United States in the party seeking such license. 62
Miller had no doubt whatsoever that the privileges or immunities
clause of the fourteenth amendment had increased federal authority.
C

The Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses

Miller's interpretation of the privileges or immunities clause in
Bradwell v. State clarifies his treatment of the due process and equal
protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment in the Slaughter-House
cases. The butchers had claimed that the monopoly deprived them of
property without due process of law. Miller noted that neither federal
nor state courts had ever considered labor to be property in this context. He then dismissed the butchers' equal protection claim. Miller
believed that only a strong case would bring anything except state action against blacks within the reach of the equal protection clause. 63
61. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 37.
62. Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 139 [emphasis added]. This case is usually cited as further evidence
of the traditional interpretation of Slaughter-House, because Miller writes:
[t]here are privileges and immunities belonging to citizens of the United States, in that relation and character, and that it is these and these alone which a State is forbidden to abridge.
But the right to admission to practice in the courts of a State is not one of them. This right in
no sense depends on citizenship of the United States.
ld The mention of "relation and character" is appropriate once more because the right to admission to practice in a court really does flow from the government, much as do corporate rights. The
mention of rights being "transferred" for their protection is sufficient to make it clear that Miller
was not attempting merely to preserve the status quo. The specification that the right here "in no
sense" depended on United States citizenship would distinguish it from the first eight
amendments.
63. As Miller wrote:
We doubt very much whether any action of a state not directed by way of discrimination
against negroes as a class, or on account of their race, will ever be held to come within the

No. 3]

PARAMETERS OF CONSTITUTIONAL RECONSTRUCTION

753

These constructions seem ominously narrow to modem lawyers because expansive treatment of the language of these clauses has been so
important in protecting personal liberties. But in Miller's eyes, his interpretation was neither narrow nor antilibertarian. He firmly believed
that the burden of the purpose of the fourteenth amendment rested on
the privileges or immunities clause.
D.

The Concluding Section

Miller closed the Slaughter-House opinion with a few reiterative
comments. Miller concluded that the fourteenth amendment did not
contain a legislative purpose to destroy the general features of the federal system. Prominent among these features was state authority to
regulate civil rights and to protect the rights of person and property.
The broad statement of the fourteenth amendment allowed for some
overlap between federal and state authority and also transformed certain rights. The federal system, however, did not maintain that states
would control all civil rights or personalliberties. 64 Miller did say explicitly that the fourteenth amendment restricted states' powers, although he was not necessarily referring to the privileges or immunities
clause. 65
E.

Miller's Quotations

Miller's opinion was a moderate construction of the fourteenth
amendment. This perception of his work should mollify the stringent
criticism that Louis Lusky levelled at him. Lusky accused Miller of
purview of this provision. It is so clearly a provision for that race and that emergency, that a
strong case would be necessary for its application to any other.
Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 80-81. Regardless of the quotability of this passage, it should not be
used to characterize Miller's construction of the whole fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., J. BAER,
supra note 2, at 107. Miller was here referring only to the equal protection clause; he talked
immediately before about laws discriminating against blacks as a class and immediately after
about "denial of equal justice."
64. Regarding the federal system, Miller noted:
The second clause protects from the hostile legislation of the States the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States [emphasis in original) as distinguished from the privileges and immunities of citizens of the States.
These latter, as defined by Justice Washington in Coifield v. Coryell, and by this court in
Ward v. Maryland, embrace generally those fundamental civil rights for the security and establishment of which organized society is instituted, and they remain, with certain exceptions
mentioned in the Federal Consritution, under the care of the state governments.
Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 37 (emphasis added).
65. Miller stated:
[W]e do not see in those Amendments any purpose to destroy the main features of the general
system. Under the pressure of all the excited feeling growing out of the war, our statesmen
have still believed that the existence of the States with powers for domestic and local government, including the regulation of civil rights, the rights of person and of property, was essential to the perfect working of our complex form of government, though they have thought
proper to impose additional limitations on the states, and to confer additional power on that
of the Nation.
ld at 82.
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deliberately misquoting sources to nullify the fourteenth amendment. 66
Miller did misquote, but only to update his sources. Misquoting is not
good academic or judicial practice, but neither is it diabolical. Analysis
of the misquotations clarifies Miller's opinion.
Miller purposely misquoted the comity clause by substituting "of"
for "in" in the fhrase "Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the
several States." 6 Neither the parties nor the dissenting Justices made
the same mistake; Justice Bradley even noted Miller's error. 68 Lusky
asserted that the change allowed Miller to formulate his dual citizenship theory and to avoid any implication of article IV, section 2 fundamental rights held by individuals precisely as citizens of the United
States prior to the fourteenth amendment. 69 In fact, this change only
helped Miller to assimilate C01jield to the analysis. He could have assimilated C01jield in other ways. Nor was Corjield as crucial to Miller's
argument as Lusky thought. Even Bradley noted that the mistake
merely encapsulated the Court's traditional interpretation. 70 Had
Miller quoted correctly, his opinion might have been modestly longer,
but the misquotation was not necessary to his analysis. He was merely
engaging in the admittedly reprehensible practice of updating constitutional language to convey better the traditional interpretation.
In addition to misquoting the Constitution, Miller did not quote
Corjield completely. He closed the quotation before Justice Washington's mention of "the right of a citizen of one State to pass through, or
to reside in, any other state" as a fundamental right. 71 Lusky argued
that, since the right to travel is a federal right, inclusion of the right to
travel in the Corjield quotation would have rendered nonsensical
Miller's use of that case. 72 Miller's concern, however, was different.
His own opinion in Crandall v. Nevada had already made travel for a
national purpose a federal right. The Corjield language listing article
IV section, 2 privileges and immunities was thus outdated. Other aspects of the right to travel, including the general Corjield right, would
have presented a problem on which Miller was not inclined to rule. 73
66. Lusky stated:
The Miller interpretation limited almost to zero the power of Congress, under the three Civil
War Amendments, to intervene in the relations of a state with its citizens in order to prevent a
national interest from being subverted as a result of hostility or indifference on the part of
state and local officials.
See L. LuSKY, supra note 2, at 193. Lusky disclaims the ad hominem argument, but that is difficult
to believe after he accused Miller of intellectual dishonesty. /d at 197. Lusky produced seven
propositions su=arizing Slaughter-House; of these seven, propositions two, three, and seven are
stated incorrectly. See id at 191-92.
67. U.S. CoNST. art. IV, § 2.
68. 83 U.S. at 117.
69. L. LUSKY, supra note 2, at 194-95.
70. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 117-18.
71. 6 F. Cas. at 552.
72. See L. LUSKY, supra note 2, at 195-96.
73. Regarding his disinclination to rule, Miller wrote:
We have given every opportunity for a full hearing at the bar; we have discussed freely and
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By considering the right to travel, the Court would have widen~d the
scope of the case and possibly would have raised the issue of the
unenumerated rights of the ninth amendment. 74 Giving a wider scope
to the fourteenth amendment would have overturned the character of
the federal system, a decision Miller would not make without explicit
constitutional mandate. For Miller, Corjield only demonstrated that
states had significant independent duties regarding some fundamental
rights. He limited the quotation to avoid complications that would
have involved wider determinations, not to avoid matters that would
have invalidated his use of Corjield
Lusky conveniently neglected to note a further omission in the
Corjield language that reinforces this relatively benign theory about
Miller's handling of sources. Miller quoted Corjield's general definition of fundamental rights of state citizenship but omitted "the enjoyment of life and liberty" as a fundamental privilege. 75 Had Miller used
Corjield to reach the conclusions asserted by Lusky, Miller would have
included that phrase in the quotation as a privilege of state citizenship.
But the life and liberty protections embodied in the first eight amendments and in article I, section 9 were now protected-so Miller
thought-against state action. Miller thus omitted that clause from the
middle of the quotation because protection of those fundamental privileges and immunities no longer depended on the states. Only a desire
compared views among ourselves; we have taken ample time for careful deliberation, and we
now propose to announce the judgments which we have formed on the construction of these
articles, so far as we have found them necessary to the decision before us, and beyond that we
have neither the inclination nor the right to go.
83 U.S. at 67.
74. Miller did not address the question of whether the fourteenth amendment would affect
the ninth amendment. The argument for incorporating ninth amendment rights is that unenumerated rights were being denied or disparaged precisely because they were unenumerated. Miller
argued that fundamentality was not the test, and that the states still protected some rights that
were every bit as fundamental as those the federal government protected. The enumeration determined only a jurisdictional question, and there was no reason to suspect-given equal protection
of the law~hat states would be any more oppressive in the future regarding unenumerated
rights than they had been at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted. The incorporation of the
ninth amendment would have defeated the general nature of the federal government as one of
delegated powers. Rejection of the test of fundamentality and preservation of the ninth amendment and the character of the federal government as a government of delegated powers are essential to preserve the stringent character of individual liberties, if constitutional law is to proceed
logically.
75. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 76. The relevant portion of Corjield with omissions indicated in brackets is as follows:
What these fundamental principles are, it would perhaps be more tedious than difficult to
enumerate. They may, however, be all comprehended under the following general heads:
Protection by the government[; the enjoyment of life and liberty], with the right to acquire
and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety, subject
nevertheless to such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the general good of
the whole. [The right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in any other state,
for purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the benefit of
the writ of habeas corpus; to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the
state; to take, hold and dispose of property, either real or personal; and an exemption from
higher taxes or impositions than are paid by the other citizens of the state.]
6 F. Cas. at 551-52.
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to update rather than a dishonest urge to conceal can be consistent with
this omission. Miller regarded Coljield not as an authority that validated his argument, but as a source of good language and a point of
common understanding.
Miller likewise studiously avoided using the Civil Rights Act of
1866 to interpret the fourteenth amendment. 76 Miller did incorrectly
state that Congress had never attempted to define the rights of United
States citizens even though the 1866 Act was undeniably such an attempt. Miller's exclusion of the 1866 Act, however, is bothersome only
if one assumes he was dishonest. Two other perhaps nonexclusive possibilities are conceivable. Miller may have viewed the movement resulting in the 1866 Act as culminating in the fourteenth amendment, so
that the 1866 Act was not an independent effort to define the rights of
citizenship. More likely, however, Miller perceived that the widespread conviction that the 1866 Act was unconstitutional necessitated
the fourteenth amendment. 77 The enactment of the fourteenth amendment could be taken-properly or improperly-as affirming the view
that the Act was unconstitutional and should be ignored. The allegations of dishonesty, then, come to nothing, because Miller's argument
gained nothing from the misquotations. If anything, the Coljield misquotation supports a more favorable interpretation of Miller's
intentions.
Miller rested his analysis of Slaughter-House primarily on the
privileges or immunities clause. His historical perceptions defined the
general direction the Court would follow with these amendments.
Searching analysis of the wording of the fourteenth amendment focused attention on the close definition of "privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States" as distinct from those of a citizen of a
state. He rejected fundamentality as the basic test for fourteenth
amendment protection and chose instead the "existence and protection" test. That choice allowed Miller to preserve exclusive state jurisdiction over a substantial range of civil rights matters while still
accomplishing the purpose of the fourteenth amendment. He nevertheless shaped his opinion to the individual case. The transformation of
the first eight amendments and article I, section 9 into restrictions
against the states awaited a relevant case. When such a case, Cruikshank, came before the Court, however, Waite abandoned Miller's reasoning. But the Slaughter-House opinion remains as an argument that
must be taken seriously. Slaughter-House, while not a monumental
achievement of judicial clarity, is a persuasive interpretation of the
fourteenth amendment.
76.
77.

See L. LUSKY, supra note 2, at 196.
/d. at 197.
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SLAUGHTER-HOUSE: THE DISSENTS

In Slaughter-House, Justices Field and Bradley argued for a
revolution in the relationship between state and federal governments.
Prior to the fourteenth amendment, state governments possessed inherent authority, whereas the federal government exercised only delegated
powers. It is only minor exaggeration to say that the Field-Bradley
interpretation of the fourteenth amendment would have made the federal government a government of inherent authority. Their dissents explicitly relegated states to incidental status. Unlike Miller, Field and
Bradley had no qualms about using one amendment to change the
whole structure of American government. They are called Radical
Republicans for a reason.
A.

Justice Field's Dissent

Field agreed with much of Miller's method, even in some areas
where modem commentators would disagree with Miller. He agreed
on the importance of Coifielt:f7 8 and of the citizenship clause of the
fourteenth amendment. 79 Likewise, he agreed that the fourteenth
amendment created no new rights. 80 He also agreed that the privileges
or immunities language of the fourteenth amendment and of the comity clause must have similar meanings and similar effects. Justice Field
even settled for an "existence and protection" test. Given such agreement on the factors shaping his dissent, Field's almost total opposition
to Miller may seem surprising. Unlike Miller, Field believed that
through the fourteenth amendment the federal government assumed
ultimate responsibility for all civil and personal rights of its citizens.
Field, like Miller, said that the outcome of the case ·depended on
the recent constitutional amendments, and particularly on the fourteenth amendment. Because Field ultimately concluded that the federal government could right any infringement whatsoever of a citizen's
fundamental privileges or immunities, he first demonstrated that the
butchers had suffered a legal wrong. He acknowledged states' inherent
police powers but maintained that the state exhausted its powers by
providing for the inspection of meat and prohibiting the slaughtering of
animals except below the city of New Orleans. To Field, any further
legislative grant was unnecessary and unreasonable. 81 Nor could the
state rely on any alleged similarity to grants of monopolies for bridges,
ferries, and similar services. These latter grants had a public character;
slaughtering animals, on the other hand, was merely an ordinary private economic calling. Rhetorically, Field opined that, if the Slaughter78. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 97; see i'!fra note 86 and accompanying text.
79. 83 U.S. at 95; see infra note 83 and accompanying text.
80. 83 U.S. at 96 (''The Amendment does not attempt to confer any new privileges or immunities upon citizens. . . .").
81. 83 U.S. at 87. See also W. NELSON, supra note 12, at 151.
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House grant was allowed to stand, states could ban in perpetuity any
ordinary calling. Having thus faced Armageddon, he tried to erect a
fourteenth amendment protection against deprivation of such rights. 82
Field's analysis of the citizenship clause departed significantly
from Miller's. Dred Scott was indeed part of the essential background
to understanding the clause by declaring that "people" in the Constitution did not mean "people" but "citizens," with the result that blacks
could not be citizens in the sense used in the Constitution. Field was
unwilling to abide by that result. He said that the fourteenth amendment recognized, rather than created, a United States citizenship distinct from state citizenship. That recognition accorded priority to
United States citizenship and relegated state citizenship to incidental
status. A citizen of a state was merelf a United States citizen who happened to reside in a particular area. 3
By relegating state citizenship to incidental status, Field achieved a
far-reaching effect for the privileges or immunities clause. All fundamental privileges or immunities of a free man or citizen were transformed and now derived from a person's status as a United States
citizen. The states, being only incidental in nature, could in no way
impair any of those rights. Residence in a given state would have as
little relevance to important rights as residence in any given town.
Since the rights no longer depended on the state, no longer owed their.
existence and protection to the state, the rights were no longer within
the exclusive control of the state. 84 Field thus turned the "existence
and protection" test against state control after putting a different and
revolutionary emphasis on the citizenship clause. Field next used rhetoric to justify his far-reaching conclusion. What had occasioned, he
asked, all the commotion surrounding the amendment if such a change
had not been intended? And for what other purpose could it have
82. 83 U.S. at 88-89.
83. Field stated:
The first clause of the founeenth Amendment changes this whole subject, and removes it
from the region of discussion and doubt. It reco~izes in express terms, if it does not create,
citizens of the United States, and it makes their Citizenship dependent upon the place of their
binh, or the fact of their adoption, and not upon the constitution or laws of any state or the
condition of their ancestry. A citizen of a state is now only a citizen of the United States
residing in that state. The fundamental rights, privileges, and immunities which belong to
him as a free man and a free citizen, now belong to him as a citizen of the United States, and
are not dependent upon his citizenship of any state. The exercise of these rights and privileges, and the degree of enjoyment received from such exercise, are always more or less affected by the condition and the local institutions of the state, or city, or town where he resides.
They are thus affected in a state by the wisdom of its laws, the ability of its officers, the
efficiency of its magistrates, the education and morals of its people, and by many other considerations. This is a result which follows from the constitution of society, and can never be
avoided, but in no other way can they be affected by the action of the state, or by the residence of the citizen therein. They do not derive their existence from its legislation, and cannot be destroyed by its power.
Jd at 95-96. This passage is quite explicit in maintaining that state governments are no more
relevant to essential rights than are town governments. Field would thereby demolish the federal
structure in favor of a purely national government.
84.

Jd
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been drafted? 85
Field then discussed the definitional and operational continuity
between the comity clause and the fourteenth amendment. He applied
the Coljield list of fundamental rights directly to the privileges or immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment. Since civil and personal
rights no longer depended on the states, the Coljieldlist of the rights of
state citizenship was no longer relevant for article IV, section 2 determinations. Rather, Coljield was a guide to defining the privileges or
immunities of United States citizens. Field reinforced this conclusion
by referring to the rights listed in the Civil Rights Act of 1866-the
forerunner of the fourteenth amendment-and by the traditional
Coljield interpretation of the comity clause. 86
The operational continuity between the comity clause and the
fourteenth amendment mandated an extensive federal jurisdiction.
The comity clause had protected citizens of state A from the hostile and
discriminatory legislation of state B. For Field, the fourteenth amendment operated in the same way. Since state citizenship was incidental,
the fourteenth amendment would forbid discrimination between any
two United States citizens regardless of any consideration of state citizenship. Field's analysis dictated that no state could create a monopoly
that unreasonably excluded citizens from an ordinary calling.
Field thus almost reversed the roles of state and federal governments. Under his view, all state legislation would be open to federal
review; no state could impair the liberties of its citizens, regardless of
motivation or equal treatment. Field's view would have revolutionized
the entire structure of the federal system. The privileges or immunities
clause of the fourteenth amendment would transform and universalize
the comity clause and thereby eliminate states as centers of social
policy. 87
Field's deductions followed quickly from his interpretation of the
85. Field wrote:
If this inhibition has no reference to privileges and immunities of this character, but only
refers, as held by the majority of the court in their opinion, to such privileges and immunities
as were before its adoption specially designated in the Constitution or necessarily implied as
belonging to citizens of the United States, it was a vain and idle enactment, which accomplished nothing and most unnecessarily excited Congress and the people on its passage.
Jd at 96. By rights that were "specially designated in the Constitution" Field may have been
thinking of those rights specified in article I, § 10. Miller's mention of the rights he derived from
the Constitution indicates that Field was wrong in this interpretation of the majority opinion.
86. See id at 97-98.
87. In the Slaughter-House case, Field stated:
What the clause in question did for the protection of the citizens of one state against hostile
and discriminating legislation of other states, the 14th Amendment does for the protection of
every citizen of the United States against hostile and discriminating legislation, against him in
favor of others whether they reside in the same or in different states. If under the 4th article
of the Constitution, equality of privileges and immunities is secured between citizens of different states, under the 14th Amendment the same equality is secured between citizens of the
United States.
ld at 100-01. Here again it is apparent that Field was eliminating state borders as relevant to
fundamental rights.
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fourteenth amendment clauses. English common ·law and the civil
law-this was a Louisiana case-both classified freedom from unreasonable monopolies as a civil right. The federal government had the
authority under the fourteenth amendment to right all state-committed
wrongs that affected important civil rights. The Slaughter-House monopoly thus violated the fourteenth amendment. 88 Field closed with a
ringing assertion of the character of United States citizenship: "This
equality of right, with exemption from all disparaging and partial enactments, in the lawful pursuits of life, throughout the whole country, is
the distinguishing privilege of citizens of the United States." 89 The idealism is attractive, but its value as constitutional interpretation is questionable. Field intended to transform into a federal right every
important right, privilege, and immunity held by an individual against
state activities. The Supreme Court would have become a perpetual
censor of all state acts; Congress would have had legislative competence in every sphere but the trivial.
B.

Justice Bradley's Dissent

Bradley's dissent reinforced Field's, but his treatment of the enumerated rights, of the rights of inhabitants of territories, and of the effects of the radical position deserve separate comment. His exhaustive
list of the privileges and immunities of the Bill of Rights and the right
to habeas corpus procedure provided clear support for a theory of incorporation.90 But Bradley was no precursor of Justice Black; he did
not believe in incorporation. The enumeration of the rights was inconsequential. For Bradley, the privileges or immunities clause protected
all civil and personal liberties equally. 91 Bradley wanted to use the
fourteenth amendment to restructure completely governmental
relations. 92
Bradley's most intriguing argument concerns the nature of the
rights of inhabitants of federal territories and those made citizens by
naturalization or annexation of territory before they became citizens of
a state. Like angels for medieval philosophers, territorial inhabitants
88. /d at 101-09.
89. Id at 109-10.
90. Bradley stated:
But others of the greatest consequence were enumerated, although they were only secured, in
express terms, from invasion by the Federal government; such as the right of habeas corpus,
the right of trial by jury, of free exercise of religious worship, the right of free speech and a
free press, the right peaceably to assemble for the discussion of public measures, the right to
be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures, and above all, and including almost all
the rest, the right of not being deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.
These, and still others are specified in the original Constitution or in the early amendments of
it, as among the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, or, what is still
stronger for the force of the argument, the rights of all persons, whether citizens or not.
Id at 118-19.
91. /d at 119. ("But even if the Constitution were silent, the fundamental privileges and
immunities of citizens, as such, would be no less real and no less inviolable than they now are.")
92. See id at 123. See also W. NELSON, supra note II, at 71.
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presented the crucial problem in a pure form. In the majority opinion,
Miller considered the issue and settled it only as far as it impinged on
his own argument. For Miller, the fourteenth amendment overturned
the prior doctrine that individuals had federal rights only by virtue of
state citizenship. Under the prior doctrine, if territorial inhabitants
were not state citizens, they had none of the enumerated rights. 93 In his
dissent, Bradley maintained otherwise and agreed with Field that there
had always been a distinct citizenship of the United States. The privileges or immunities of United States citizens could be ascertained by
examining the acknowledged privileges or immunities of inhabitants of
territories who were United States citizens but not citizens of a state. 94
Miller did not argue that the status of the rights of territorial inhabitants after the fourteenth amendment was relevent to SlaughterHouse, which concerned a right not enumerated in the Constitution.
But as an index for post-fourteenth amendment privileges and immunities of United States citizens, the status of territorial inhabitants would
seem a determinative argument. The privileges or immunities necessarily enjoyed by such citizens include habeas corpus and the first eight
amendments as privileges or immunities of United States citizens. Although Bradley's argument was not determinative in Slaughter-House,
he made Miller confront the problem squarely. This argument is a further reason for believing that at the time of Slaughter-House Miller
would have included the first eight amendments and the various relevant portions of article I, section 9 within the protection of the privileges or immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Bradley, despite his superficial agreement with Miller on this
point, was a radical. He supported the butchers on the basis of the
privileges or immunities clause, the due process clause, and the equal
protection clause. He castigated Miller for a restrictive reading of the
due process clause95 and implied that Miller wanted to nullify the
amendment. That implication served as a counterpoise to Bradley's
defense of the radical position. He admitted that some feared that the
radical interpretation would lead to massive congressional intervention
in the internal affairs of the states. He dismissed those fears by asserting that the courts, not Congress, would normally handle the relevant
matters. The fundamental rights, in his view, would soon become so
well known that little litigation would arise. The fourteenth amendment would largely be self-executing. 96
Bradley's capacity for optimism was extraordinary. Modem lawyers will see Miller's caution about federal power to review state legislation on the grounds of reasonableness as a much more realistic
93.
94.
95.
96.

83 U.S. at 72-73.
Jd at 119.
Jd at 122-23.
Jd at 123-24.
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evaluation of the probable effects of Bradley's construction. But Bradley's portrayal of Miller's opinion made it easier for later courts to read
Miller's opinion very superficially. Bradley-and more so, Justice
Swayne97-clarified the radical nature of the dissents.
C

The Majority-Dissent D!fferences

The difference between the majority and the dissenting opinions in
Slaughter-House is not the difference between a complete nullification
of the amendment and a reasoned implementation. Miller's interpretation was moderate. His construction flows from the language of the
amendment itself and from certain assumptions shared with the dissenters. It reflects a realistic purpose for the fourteenth amendment
and uses the privileges or immunities clause in an expansive role to
secure liberties that attach to United States citizenship. But without
explicit language authorizing so radical a change, Miller refused to use
the fourteenth amendment to restructure completely the federal system.
The dissenters would have used the fourteenth amendment as a lever
for exactly that purpose. State governments would no longer have
served as a check on federal authority. Even Justice Bradley did not
really deny that far-reaching consequences could occur as a result of
the radical construction. He only said that such things would not happen, not that they could not. Miller's realism was far more sensible.
IV.

A.

CRUIKSHANK

Background

United States v. Cruikshan/(J 8 accomplished the nullification of the
fourteenth amendment that scholars traditionally attribute to Slaughter-House. Chief Justice Waite, not a member of the Slaughter-House
Court, wrote the opinion. He misread Slaughter-House and began his
analysis on the principle that state and federal privileges and immunities were absolutely distinct. Without directly analyzing the fourteenth
amendment, he derived a multiplicity of jurisdictionally defined rights.
This approach was suggested by and was appropriate to corporate
rights, but was not appropriate for those rights contained in the Bill of
Rights. Waite thereby deviated from the traditional approach that insisted that individuals had inherent liberties which did not derive from
governmental grants. Cruikshank has neither the moderation nor the
modest respectability of Slaughter-House.
97. See id at 124-30. Swayne's dissent adds little to the argument. He would have placed
the analytic burden on the due process clause, particularly on the meaning of "liberty" and "property." He forthrightly acknowledged the revolutionary effect of his construction. Id at 129. ("It
is objected that the power conferred is novel and large. The answer is that the novelty was known
and the measure deliberately adopted. The power is beneficient in its nature, and cannot be
abused.")
98. 92 u.s. 542 (1876).
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Cruikshank, another Louisiana case, concerned a sixteen-count indictment under the Civil Rights Enforcement Act of 1870. The prosecution alleged that the defendants banded together and conspired to
deprive black citizens of their constitutional rights. The only rights
specifically named in the indictment were assembly, petition, and the
bearing of arms. 99 The rights of assembly and petition were precisely
those rights listed in Slaughter-House as privileges or immunities of
United States citizens. The Supreme Court quashed the indictment for
insufficient specificity, and the analysis correctly focused on whether
the fourteenth amendment guaranteed the rights listed in the
indictment.
Waite wanted to demonstrate the distinction between state and
federal governments. Accordingly, he wrote in terms of powers, arguing that there was absolutely no overlap between state and federal powers. 100 He concluded that the duty to protect was strictly limited by the
power possessed. 101 Waite's stress on the duty to protect indicates the
more restrictive interpretation he followed. Justice Waite used the
analogy of the situation in which a single act made a person amenable
to both federal and state jurisdictions, such as a breach of the peace by
resisting a federal officer serving process within a state jurisdiction.
That dual liability, he explained, did not indicate any overlap of powers; it derived solely from different aspects of that act. To Waite, the
aspects of the act were completely different in character. 102 Thus, he
concluded that there was a necessary and absolute divergence between
the rights of a state citizen and those of a United States citizen.
B.

Aspect Analysis

Waite analyzed the subject matter of the indictments by dividing
99. Id at 548.
100. In Bradwell, the coun uses power terminology. See 83 U.S. at 139. See supra note 62
and accompanying text.
101. As Waite concluded:
The same person may be at the same time a citizen of the United States and a citizen of a
State, but his rights of citizenship under one of these governments will be different from those
he has under the other. . . . The duty of a government to afford protection is limited always
by the power it possesses for that purpose.
92 U.S. at 549. He added: "The people of the United States resident within any State are subject
to two governments: one State, and the other National; but there need be no conflict between the
two. The powers which one possesses, the other does not." Id at 550.
102. Waite noted:
True, it may sometimes happen that a person is amenable to both jurisdictions for one and
the same act. Thus, if a Marshal of the United States is unlawfully resisted while executing
the process of the courts within a State, and the resistance is accompanied by an assault on
the officer, the sovereignty of the United States is violated by the resistance, and that of the
State by the breach of peace, in the assault. . . . This does not, however, necessarily imply
that the two governments possess powers in common, or bring them into conflict with each
other. . . . No rights can be acquired under the Constitution or laws of the United States,
except such as the Government of the United States has the authority to grant or secure. All
that cannot be so granted or secured are left under the protection of the States.
Id at 550-51.
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each right into its component aspects. He identified, for example,
three different rights of peaceable assembly (or petition or bearing
arms). There was the first amendment right: the privilege or immunity
of a United States citizen to assemble peaceably without interference
from the United States government or its officials. As explained previously, 103 the only way a state could interfere with this right which was
directed only against the federal government, was to grant the federal
government the power to interfere with individuals attempting to assemble peaceably. Since the adoption of the first amendment, of
course, this aspect of the right to assemble peaceably was secure against
state action.
The second right of assembly was assembly for a national purpose.104 This right did not come from any provision in the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, or the fourteenth amendment. It came from the
necessities of the national government, as in Crandall 105 This variety
of assembly was only a relatively small proportion of all possible assemblies: the purpose of the assembly had to be related to the national
government, such as an assembly to petition the national government
about a grievance. The second right of assembly, however, was protected both against state action (as it would be through the fourteenth
amendment) and against all and sundry. 106 This additional scope of
protection reinforced its distinction from the first amendment right.
This right, closely related to the analysis in Crandall, did not need fourteenth amendment protection, although the fourteenth amendment
might provide a convenient source for further protection. These first
two rights of assembly antedated the fourteenth amendment, but were
the only rights of assembly Waite acknowledged as being held by citizens of the United States. Therefore, under Waite's analysis, the fourteenth amendment had been only declaratory in this regard.
The third right of assembly was the general right, that is, assembly
for all purposes other than federal, and protection against interference
by both fellow citizens and state governments. 107 Waite maintained
that this aspect of the right of assembly was not a privilege or immunity
of a United States citizen, because, utilizing the Slaughter-House
103. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
104. 92 U.S. at 552-53.
105. See supra notes 46, 53 and accompanying text.
106. Regarding the right to assemble, the opinion stated:
The right of the people peaceably to assemble for the purpose of petitioning Congress for a
redress of grievances, or for anything else connected with the powers or the duties of the
National Government, is an attribute of national citizenship, and, as such, under the protection of and guarantied [sic] by, the United States. . . . If it had been alleged in these counts
that the object of the defendants was to prevent a meeting for such a purpose, the case would
have been within the statute, and within the scope of the sovereignty of the United States.
92 U.S. at 552-53. This means that by a Cruikshank interpretation, such an assembly is under the
protection of the federal government against all and sundry, not just against state action. The
protection, however, does not originally derive from the fourteenth amendment.
107. Jd at 552.
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"existence and protection" test, the right fell under the protective powers of the states. Waite fortified this conclusion by referring to the rule
in Gibbons v. Ogden: if the power had not been delegated to the federal
government, it remained with the states. 108 Waite therefore concluded
that the general right of peaceable assembly remained a right of state
citizenship, outside the protective scope of the fourteenth amendment.
After dividing the rights according to their different jurisdictional
aspects, Waite subjected each of these "mini-rights" to the SlaughterHouse test. But here, Waite refrained completely from quoting the
fourteenth amendment. He did not base his argument on the language
of the privileges or immunities clause. He made no attempt to explain
the privileges or immunities clause or the comity clause. Waite quoted
the fourteenth amendment only when considering equal protection and
due process rights. 109
Justice Waite chose to ignore the careful analysis in SlaughterHouse. He only cited Slaughter-House, inaccurately, to support his assertion that the rights of state and United States citizens necessarily
diverged absolutely. 110 As a result, he based Cruikshank on a mere
impression derived from Slaughter-House. Because aspect analysis
would leave the privileges and immunities of United States citizens unchanged from what they were prior to the fourteenth amendment,
Waite managed to deprive the clause of all significance. He thus rejected the force Slaughter-House had found in the fourteenth amendment and adopted the conservative portion of the Slaughter-House
analysis that only made sense with a powerful privileges or immunities
clause. Under Waite's aspect analysis, the conclusion of the case was
inevitable. The Court held that the indictments in Cruikshank did not
allege interference with any right of United States citizenship.
C

The Character

o.f Rights

Waite's characterization of rights and the conclusions he drew
from that characterization were severely flawed. His use of aspect
analysis yielded an inadequate perception of American rights. Jurisdictionally defined rights-the mini-rights of his opinion-were the
equivalent of government-granted rights, a conceptualization completely contrary to the perception of rights in late eighteenth-century
America. Moreover, even on its own terms, Waite's argument was
carelessly drawn and lacking in insight. But the opinion did correspond to the lawyer's instinct to regard rights in relation to the jurisdiction and thus to ignore rights when jurisdiction is absent. The sole
virtue of that approach, however, is the restraint it puts on lawyers,
who must function within a given jurisdictional system; the pragmatism
108.
109.
110.

ld at 551-52.
See id at 549.
See id at 554.
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of the approach prevents wastefull expenditure of client's resources.
Convenience and pragmatism, nevertheless, do not always yield correct
constitutional interpretation. They certainly did not here.
Rights can either be conceptualized as inherent or as granted by
government; Waite's choice of jurisdictionally defined rights opted for
the latter. But late eighteenth-century Americans would have rejected
vehemently any formulation that made rights derivative of governmental provisions. To the significant extent that the colonists fought the
Revolutionary War to secure liberty, they were fighting to maintain
rights that the British government did not protect, that the government
had not granted the colonies. Americans decisively rejected the idea
that rights only derived from governmental grants. That rejection entailed the acceptance of a view of rights based on natural law and thus
inherent in individuals. The acceptance of this conceptualization was
the major and probably the sole contribution of natural law to the
Constitution.
For Americans' personal rights inhered in individuals and were
thus decisively different from corporate rights. Rights to assemble
peaceably, to petition, and to bear arms were unitary, not fragmented
rights. They were merely protected in different ways by different governmental bodies. Even today that perception remains; it appears regularly when Americans evaluate foreign governments as oppressive. If
rights are inherent, aspect analysis is intrinsically improper.
Cruikshank's success derives at least in part from the way in which
Waite used classical theory in his analysis. That the Bill of Rights acted as a restraint only on the federal government was venerable doctrine. Waite reasoned that, because the federal government was a
government of delegated powers and not a government of inherent authority, the designed rights eliminated any authority. The rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights were merely exceptions to powers. 111 If
the Bill of Rights worked merely to cut powers short, to eradicate completely federal power in certain areas, and to put an absolute limit on
the extent of national power, then the Bill of Rights could not act as a
grant of power. 112 It could not act as an authorization to the federal
government to protect the various enumerated rights. Thus far, Waite's
argument could not be faulted. It is in fact improper to talk of rights as
trumps to powers except in regard to a government of inherent authority. Trumping implies that the government has the power to act in an
area unless an adversely affected party objects. There are, however,
areas in which the federal government simply has no power to act, regardless of the quiescence of those affected. 113 Treatment of the
Ill. 2 B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 912 (1971) (amendments proposed by New York), 1029-31 (Madison proposing the amendments to Congress).
112. 92 U.S. at 551-52.
113. P. 80BBIT, CONSTITUTIONAL fATE 146 (1982).
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liberties in the Bill of Rights as exceptions to powers had an impeccable
ancestry.
Waite based his test for fourteenth amendment protection directly
on that analysis, without considering the purpose of the fourteenth
amendment, the analogy to article 4, section 2, or the analysis of
Slaughter-House. Waite demanded that a right be created, be protected, and receive guaranteed, continuous protection from the federal
government to be accorded fourteenth amendment privileges or immunities status. 114 That test was functionally equivalent to the SlaughterHouse test, although it reflected the Paul v. Virginia origins of the
Slaughter-House test; 115 now amplified by Waite's preference for jurisdictionally defined rights, it adhered slightly more to a corporate formulation. Classical theory, then, forbade thinking about the Bill of
Rights as a grant of powers. The classical approach reinforced aspect
analysis which distinguished between the general right and the right as
against the federal government. Application of the test yielded the
plausible conclusion that the general rights-of assembly, petition, or
bearing of arms-gained no further security from the Bill of Rights.
Therefore, the general right remained unaffected by the fourteenth
amendment.
Waite discussed the matter of general rights only in an easy context: an individual whose rights had been violated. Any affected individual had to sort through the various jurisdictions for the appropriate
forum. He would find no help in federal courts for infringements of
the general right (at least under aspect analysis or before the fourteenth
amendment). Waite admitted willingly that a single act could render a
person amenable to both state and federal jurisdictions. Thus, a federal officer could breach the peace, a state offense, while interfering
with a peaceable assembly, a federal offense. That different aspects of
a single act could constitute different offenses in different jurisdictions
seemed compatible with legal practice and was thus acceptable to
lawyers.
Even granting his theoretical assumptions, however, Waite's analysis was incorrect. The general rights received additional protection
from having been enumerated in the Bill of Rights. The federal government acts on states as well as on individuals. One of the problems
114. Waite stated:
[We must) ascertain whether the several rights ... are such as had been in law and in fact
granted or secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. . . . It was not, therefore, a right granted to the people by the Constitution. The Government of the United States,
when established, found it in existence, with the obligation on the part of the States to afford
it protection. . . . The right was not created by the Amendment; neither was its continuance
guarantied [sic], except as against congressional interference. This is not a right granted by
the Constitution. Neither is it in any manner dependent uron that instrument for its
existence.
ld at 551-53. Waite then defined the claimed rights as arising under internal police powers.
115. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
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that necessitated the Bill of Rights was the possibility that federal oppression of individuals could nullify states as independent centers of
social policy. Such action was possible through any of the delegated
powers; James Madison utilized the examples of the powers to tax and
to make treaties. Under the former, prior to the adoption of the Bill of
Rights, Congress might have authorized the use of general warrants. 116
Under the latter, the federal government might have abolished the
right to bear arms or might have established a religion to appease an
enemy. 117 Such federal action would have abolished the general rights.
The first and second amendments, however, precluded any such federal
action. The Bill of Rights thus provided additional protection for the
general rights. This additional protection would not have made the federal government the primary protector of these rights. Under Waite's
analysis, until the fourteenth amendment, states still could have restricted such rights of their own citizens. Nevertheless, Waite was
clearly wrong when he asserted that these rights gained no additional
security from the federal constitution.U 8 Even under Waite's analysis,
then, the enumerated rights in the Constitution should have been privileges and immunities of United States citizens in the sense required for
fourteenth amendment protection.
The argument for incorporating the enumerated liberties is even
stronger if the right is an inherent unitary right. A test that requires
determining which entity created the right causes problems, but only
because it is an inappropriate test for inherent rights. The first and
second amendments certainly protected and guaranteed the rights alleged in Cruikshank. As long as those amendments survived, at least
one portion of the rights would be enforced and would constitute a part
of the political heritage. People would be immune from interference by
the federal government and undoubtedly would feel wronged when
treated more oppressively by state governments than by the federal
government. Even without the fourteenth amendment, jurisdictional
differences in standards would inevitably create discontent; state governments would have difficulty eradicating those liberties. And if the
right is unitary, protection of the right in certain situations must be
construed as protection of the right generally. The problem becomes
tautological. Waite, however, discarded the notion of inherent rights
and did not consider the crucial situations. As a result, Cruikshank is a
decision of little intellectual merit.
D.

The Holding

Waite concluded the decision by quashing all sixteen indictments.
The decision was not controversial within the Court: the sole dissent
116.
117.
118.

2 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note Ill, at 1030-31.
Id at 1088.
See 92 U.S. at 552.
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was a concurrence. Field, Bradley, and Swayne were all still Justices
and chose not to dissent. Perhaps the lack of specificity in the indictments seemed a good reason to quash them. 119 The unanimity on the
ultimate conclusion, however, created a deficient analysis. Only a superficial interpretation of Slaughter-House, followed by poor analysis,
could result in excluding the enumerated liberties from fourteenth
amendment protection. Ironically, Waite managed, under the banner
of Slaughter-House, to exclude the examples that Miller had named in
dictum as appropriate privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States.
One might think that Miller's silence in Cruikshank amounted to
tacit consent. It is more likely, given the lack of dissenting opinions
from Field, Bradley, and Swayne, that the case simply did not seem an
appropriate field of battle. Unfortunately, Waite's opinion determined
the subsequent direction of the Court. The Cruikshank analysis survived as the authoritative interpretation of Slaughter-House. 120
V.

CONCLUSION

Legal analysis grafts new conclusions onto existing lines of construction, often inappropriately. In Cruikshank, Waite was unusually
successful in that endeavor. Both the obscurity of Miller's SlaughterHouse opinion and the dissent's characterization of Miller's approach
reinforced Waite's analysis. After Cruikshank, of course, the crucial
question for practicing lawyers was not what Slaughter-House actually
said, but which construction of Slaughter-House the Court was actually
following. That pragmatic feature of legal analysis leads away from
constitutional meaning. Court-established tests assume a decided superiority to constitutional language. Waite did not reexamine the privileges or immunities clause. Slaughter-House had done that. The first
case, misunderstood and unexamined, shielded subsequent cases from
the force of the fourteenth amendment's language. Waite avoided the
fourteenth amendment language and concentrated instead on the established test and general governmental theory.
In Slaughter-House, Miller had no such shield. He felt bound to
give the privileges or immunities clause a substantial meaning related
to the purpose for which it was adopted. He believed that judicial action could not properly nullify constitutional provisions. Such provisions must either be changed by the people or be given a sensible, fair,
and substantial role by the Court. Miller opted for a great but still
limited increase in federal power. His construction left little room for
judicial imperialism, whereas the dissenters' test of fundamentality
would have left the Court with vast discretionary authority to deny,
disparage, or create rights. Of course, incorporation of the enumerated
119.
120.

See 23 L.Ed. 588, 589 (where such concerns were brought before the Court).
See supra notes 4, 7.
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rights via the privileges or immunities clause was not the historical
original intent. The historical intent encompassed numerous different
understandings. 121 However, the appropriate point is that incorporating enumerated rights through the privileges or immunities clause is
the only construction that responds both to the varied motivations behind the amendment and to the constitutional language.
The Miller opinion in Slaughter-House was thus one of substantial
integrity that balanced the need for new federal protection of rights
with the continued survival of states as independent centers of social
policy. He began his analysis of constitutional meaning by rigorously
examining the language and grammar of the fourteenth amendment. If
that first step revealed ambiguity, the correct meaning was the one that
fell within the parameters of the historical purpose of the provision,
broadly considered. If various constructions suited the purpose, the
Court would choose that construction most consonant with the rest of
the Constitution. But in all this, Miller believed that every part of a
constitutional provision had to be accorded substantial meaning.
Whatever the Court's reasons for not overruling this portion of Slaughter-House, that element of constitutional wisdom is a good reason for
maintaining it. If the current Supreme Court would follow Miller's approach, the Court could enliven the privileges or immunities clause by
incorporating the enumerated privileges or immunities. This approach
could also eliminate substantive due process analysis with relatively little loss and could reestablish the federal government as an institution
of only delegated powers. Whatever approach the Court takes, however, the Court cannot use Slaughter-House to justify the nullification
of the privileges or immunities clause.

121. Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L.
5 (1949). See also Meyer, The Blaine Amendment and the Bill of Rights, 64 HARV. L. REV.
939 (1951).
REv.

